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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to Node Replication attacks or Clone
attacks. Among all the existing clone detection protocols in WSNs, RAWL shows the most
promising results by employing Simple RandomWalk (SRW). More recently, RAND outper-
forms RAWL by incorporating Network Division with SRW. Both RAND and RAWL have
used SRW for random selection of witness nodes which is problematic because of fre-
quently revisiting the previously passed nodes that leads to longer delays, high expendi-
tures of energy with lower probability that witness nodes intersect. To circumvent this
problem, we propose to employ a new kind of constrained random walk, namely Single
Stage Memory RandomWalk and present a distributed technique called SSRWND (Single
Stage Memory RandomWalk with Network Division). In SSRWND, single stage memory
random walk is combined with network division aiming to decrease the communication and
memory costs while keeping the detection probability higher. Through intensive simulations
it is verified that SSRWND guarantees higher witness node security with moderate commu-
nication and memory overheads. SSRWND is expedient for security oriented application
fields of WSNs like military and medical.
Introduction
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is formed by grouping resource constrained sensor nodes
that are capable of sensing and communicating and thus can be employed in a wide variety of
sensing applications [1, 2], like health, traffic and environment monitoring etc. WSNs are vul-
nerable to many harmful attacks due to the circumstances that sensors lack tamper proof hard-
ware and are deployed in tough, antagonistic and unattended environments. Node replication
attack or clone attack is the focus of this paper in which an adversary compromises one or
more sensor nodes by physically capturing the nodes (compromising secret credentials) and
then creates replicas or clones of the compromised nodes, finally, secretly and deliberately
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deploying clones at various positions of the network. These replicas or clones can target a wide
variety of applications like border security, battlefield surveillance and fire alarms to object
tracking. The adversaries can launch other insider attacks like blackhole, wormhole, selective
forwarding and DoS attacks etc. [3, 4] by leveraging these replicas.
One possible solution to detect these clones is to equip the sensor nodes with built in hard-
ware that is resistant to tampering but it is not economical to provide each sensor with a
tamper proof hardware. Moreover, there may be still a possibility that a smart adversary can be
able to evade tamper proof hardware. Therefore, software based clone detection algorithms can
be a better solution. Software based solutions for clone detection in static WSNs can be catego-
rized into two major classes, centralized and distributed.
Centralized detection schemes are based Base station or cluster head, for detecting clones
[5–8]. But all of these techniques have disadvantages of single point of failure and high com-
munication costs besides achieving high clone detection rates. Thus the researchers were
inclined to detect clones in a distributed manner without involving any central authority. The
distributed detection schemes are called witness node based techniques [9–14] that are based
on framework called claimer-reporter-witness for detecting clones. In these techniques each
node (claimer node) sends its ID with locations information to its one hope neighbors
(reporter node). The reporter node is responsible for mapping the claimer id to one or more
witness nodes. The witness nodes are responsible for taking decisions for detecting clones. Wit-
ness nodes are the foundation of witness node based techniques since they are the ones capable
of making decisions for identifying and uncovering the clones and therefore they are the major
point of interest for adversaries. It is therefore very essential to ensure the security of witnesses.
The working of witness based schemes is demonstrated in Fig 1.
There are two major concerns with the existing witness node based techniques that can
undermine the security of witness nodes; first is the selection of witness nodes i.e. the witness
Fig 1. The Claimer Reporter Witness Based Framework
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g001
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nodes are selected deterministically and second is the distribution of witness nodes i.e. the wit-
ness nodes are distributed non-uniformly over the network. For the ideal detection of clones
with ensured security of witnesses, the witness nodes should be selected smartly that an
attacker won’t be able to predict about the witness nodes. Furthermore, the distribution of wit-
ness nodes should be uniform over the entire network so as to make it difficult for an adversary
to guess about witnesses. Hence, there is a need to develop a technique that claims to ensure
witness node security with moderate communication and memory overheads.
Encompassing the existing attempts done so far aiming to detect clones in static WSNs,
RAWL [12] seems to be the most favorable approach. This is because RAWL solves the prob-
lems of other witness node based strategies by selecting witness nodes randomly and then initi-
ating several random walks throughout the network. Besides achieving reasonable security of
witnesses RAWL has still some noteworthy defects. Firstly, RAWL trades off costs incurred for
communication and memory to achieve higher probability of detecting clones and stronger
security of witnesses. Secondly, RAWL ensures achieving witness node intersection by initiating
more random walks with longer walk steps. Thirdly, RAWL demands more reporters for initi-
ating random walks that can forward the location claim to randomly selected nodes which all
then initiate random walks the nodes on the passing way also become the witnesses.
RAND [13, 14] is the most recent proposal for clone detection in static WSNs which
endeavors to combine simple random walk with network division, thus producing much better
results than RAWL. It is verified through simulations that RAND outperforms RWAL as wit-
ness node security is ensured via dividing the network into different areas. Furthermore, this
results into moderate overheads in terms of memory and communication.
Both RAND and RAWL employ a simple or pure random walk strategy [15, 16] (a.k.a.,
“memory less” or “blind” random walk) for selecting the critical witnesses randomly. Using
simple random walk mechanism the selection of next node to be visited highly depends upon
the current node and since no history or records are maintained about the visited nodes. An
important reason for employing random walk is due to its simplicity and low-overhead. Also
utilizing random walk for selecting witness nodes to detect clones in WSNs avoids unnecessary
needs of bandwidth and energy resources which the other flooding type techniques usually
consume. However, SRW has some problems. Firstly, previously passed nodes are revisited fre-
quently resulting in the higher probability that the same nodes will become the witness nodes.
Consequently, nodes energy will be depleted soon and then they die since same nodes are
selected again and again as witness nodes. Secondly, frequently revisiting the nodes decrease
the chances of witness node intersection, that leads to a lower probability of detecting clones as
well as it makes it easy for an attacker to guess about the witness nodes since the same nodes
are visited again and again.
To solve the above dilemma and thwart the noteworthy shortcomings of RAND and
RAWL, we are motivated to develop a detection scheme that is more efficient in detecting
clones. The contributions of this work are:
1. We propose a new kind of random walk called Single Stage Memory RandomWalk and
introduce a novel technique called SSRWND by combining the benefits of Single Stage
Memory RandomWalk with Network Division. In SSRWND when a random walk is initi-
ated, the next node to be visited is chosen with a condition that the node should not be the
node itself (current node) or the previously passed node.
2. We perform extensive simulations, comparing the results of SSRWND with RAND, RAWL
and TRAWL. The simulation results show that the communication and memory costs are
reduced and high security of witness nodes is ensured with increased probability of detect-
ing clones.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we summarize the most related lit-
erature. In Section III we describe the assumed network and adversary models. In Section IV,
we present SSRWND in detail. In Section V we present the simulation results and in Section VI
we finally conclude the paper.
RelatedWork
In this section, we summarize some of the most recent and most related witness node based
techniques, identifying their shortcomings.
Randomized Multicast (RM) and Line-Selected Multicast (LSM) detection schemes were
proposed by B.Parno et al. [9]. In RM, locations claims of claimer nodes are distributed to a set
of witnesses that are selected randomly by each reporter node (one hop neighbor nodes). By
exploiting Birthday Paradox [17] intersecting witness nodes are achieved that are responsible
for identifying the clone detection. In LSM the nodes who forward the location claims can also
server the witnesses by exploiting the network routing topology and geometric probability to
find the conflicting location claims. The main problem of both RM and LSM is in probabilistic
selection of the witness nodes. Moreover, LSM suffers from crowded center problem.
RED was proposed by Conti et al. [7, 8] that is comprised of two phases. The first phase is
sharing a random value, rand among all the nodes through base station. The second phase is
the clone detecting phase in which location claim is sent to a set of pseudo-randomly selected
network locations. A powerful smart attacker can easily compromise the witnesses since wit-
ness node selection is deterministic. Also the infrastructure for distributing RED’s random
seed may not always be available.
Single Deterministic Cell (SDC) and Parallel Multiple Probabilistic Cells (P-MPC) were
proposed by Zhu et al. [10, 11]. In SDC and P-MPC each node Id is mapped to a geographical
grid called cell. In SDC, the node ID is mapped to a single deterministic cell whereas in
P-MPC, node ID is mapped to multiple deterministic cells (using geographic hash function)
[18]. The location claims are broadcasted in each cell and the storing nodes become the witness
nodes that revoke the clones form the network by identifying the conflicting claims. The selec-
tion of cell size is vital in both of these schemes since high communication costs are incurred
on the selection of large cell and selecting a small cell size leads to effortless witness node
compromise.
RandomWalk (RAWL) and Table-assisted RandomWalk (TRAWL) were proposed by Y.
Zeng et al. [12]. In RAWL SRW is used to select witnesses which can revoke the replicated
nodes form the network upon receiving the conflicting claims. TRAWL follows the same detec-
tion procedure as RAWL but memory costs are reduced by using trace table at each node. For
achieving higher detection probability RAWL and TRAWL need more random walks with lon-
ger walk steps, leading to higher communication and memory costs as compared to LSM. Fig 2
demonstrates the working of RAWL and TRAWL.
RAND [13, 14] combines SRW with network division and performs two steps, the network
configuration step divides the entire network into hierarchical levels, formulating one or more
levels a specific area. In the replica detection step, reporters initiate SRWs in each randomly
selected area to selection of witnesses. Each pass node by random walk will become a witness
node and store the location claim. The network division helps to reduce the communication
and memory costs ensure the high security of witness nodes. The working of RAND can be
illustrated by using Fig 3.
The contribution in [19] are reviewed and after further investigating the SSRWND protocol
by theoretically analyzing the network division and selection of areas mechanism, the expected
return time of random walk, security analysis and efficiency analysis are presented in this
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paper. The further simulations prove that SSRWND outperforms the previous schemes in-
terms of high security of witnesses and detection probability with moderate overheads. Details
of other more recent replica detection and authentication schemes can be found in [20–36].
Requirements for Claimer-Reporter-Witness Node Based Schemes
Claimer Reporter Witness (CRW) based (or witness node based) Schemes are considered to be
the most efficient techniques so far. However, they also have several limitations. They lack
some vital requirements which should be taken into account while designing distributed wit-
ness node based techniques. In CRW-based schemes, witness nodes (intersecting witnesses)
are an important element as these witnesses detect and revoke the clones. Thus, the basic
requirements for designing CRW-based techniques are about the random selection, security
and uniform distribution of these witnesses.
In this section, we describe these essential requirements for distributed claimer reporter wit-
ness node based schemes which should be fulfilled to make clone detection more effective and
robust.
1. Witness Selection:Most importantly witnesses should be selected non-deterministically
with equal probability of being witnesses. With deterministic witness selection, smart attack
can be launched by an attacker who greedily chooses witnesses.
2. Witness Distribution: The second requirement is the distribution of witness nodes. The wit-
ness nodes should be distributed uniformly throughout the network
3. Witness Security: The security of witnesses can be easily compromised in deterministic
schemes due to small number of witnesses and can be under the control of an attacker
Fig 2. Working Principle of RAWL& TRAWL.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g002
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during the lifetime of the network. When witnesses are selected non-deterministically an
attackers is unable to judge about the critical witnesses. The security of witnesses can be
safeguarded by making the scheme both ID and area oblivious (No information of ID and
Location) and by giving each node an equal probability of being witnesses regardless of its
geographic location respectively. The detection probability of clones can be higher by certi-
fying the security of critical witnesses.
4. Overheads: Designing protocols with lower overhead is challenging dueto the resource con-
strains. Energy drain of the nodes will affect the functionality the whole and if only few
nodes experience high memory demand, then these nodes will start dropping packet as
result of memory overflow. Developing protocols with moderate overheads and higher
detection probability is very important.
Network and Adversary Model
A large number of uniformly distributed static low cost sensor nodes knowing their location
are assumed. Each node knows its geographic location by using localization schemes. Nodes
are stationary each having a unique ID with a pair of identity based public and private keys and
remains static until end of each protocol execution. Attackers cannot create new IDs for their
replicas as nodes are protected by pair wise keys similar to [7–9, 12–14]. New nodes can replace
the old or dead nodes into the network [10, 11] that need to forward their location claim to
their one hop neighbors.
Adversaries are assumed to be simple but powerful that can deploy clones (deliberately) in
the network created by capturing and compromising sensors. An adversary is assumed to be
Fig 3. Assignment of Levels and Areas during Network Division [13, 14]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g003
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capable of capturing and compromising only a limited number of nodes. SWATT [37] can be
employed if unlimited sensor nodes are compromised by the adversary.
SSRWND
To describe the proposed distributed protocol SSRWND we resort claimer-reporter-witness
framework. SSRWND works in the same manner as [13, 14] with the difference of employing a
new kind of random walk termed as single stage memory random walk for the selection of wit-
nesses. SSRWND combines network division with this new kind of random walk which in
result not only achieves high detection probability but the overheads are also reduced as com-
pared to RAND and RAWL. We identify that by employing Simple RandomWalk in RAND,
the selection of the next node at random leads to frequent revisiting of nodes that results in
long delays and higher energy consumption. To avoid this problem, we propose SSRWND
which selects unvisited neighbors and thus accelerates the detection process.
SSRWND performs two steps; network division and replica/clone detection. Network divi-
sion starts by the tagging process in which different hierarchical levels are formed by entire net-
work division, formulating a specific area with one or more levels. With respect to a particular
sink, levels are then assigned to all the nodes, each node belonging to a certain level and area.
Distance to the assigned sink constitutes a level and according to the sink configuration, differ-
ent number of levels comprises each area. The network division (in levels & areas) takes inspi-
ration from [38] where the detailed process is described. During the network division the levels
and areas are assigned to nodes as shown in Fig 3.
In the beginning of replica/clone detection a signed location claim
hIDa; loca; SigfHðIDaklocaÞgKPvta i is broadcasted by each node (claimer node) to its neighbors,
where || indicating the concatenation operation and loca the location information of node a.
The veriﬁcation of the signature along with the plausible location of a claimer is done by each
reporter upon receiving the claim. With some probability, the neighboring nodes serve as the
reporters of that claimer that only forward the location claim to randomly selected nodes.
Each reporter first randomly selects area(s) through the proposed area selection mechanism
(that defines how many areas reporter should select from the total number of areas) and then
forwards in those randomly selected areas the location claim to randomly selected nodes
depending upon the number of areas the entire network is divided into. Using Eq (1), the
reporters will randomly select areas when the network is divided into odd number of areas
(> = 3). Likewise using Eq (2), the reporters will randomly select areas when the network is
divided into even number of areas (> = 4).
As ¼
At þ 1
2
 
ð1Þ
As ¼
At
2
þ 1
 
ð2Þ
Where As indicates the areas to select and At represents the entire network division into total
number of areas. Using Eq (3) the total number of possible combinations can be calculated for
any number of areas that are unordered and without replacement.
C
At
As
¼ At!
As!ðAt  AsÞ!
ð3Þ
After the selection of number of areas, any one possible combination of areas is randomly
selected by the reporters (using Eq (3)) in order to forward the location claim. From any areas
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of the network the reporters follow the above method for selecting any combination of areas,
resulting to achieve at-least one intersecting area. The network division into odd number of
areas results in at least one intersecting area whereas the network division into even number of
areas results in at least two intersecting areas.
In each randomly selected area, the claim is forwarded to g locations by the reporter with
some probability through randomly selected single node (geographic location is selected by
using GPRS [39]). It is noticed in [7, 8, 12] that a random location is a better secure choice than
a node id). Fig 4 shows the working and witness node selection of RAND.
On receiving the location claim each randomly selected node in each area verifies the signa-
ture, stores that claim and becomes the witness of that claimer. Then this first witness starts r
single stage memory random walks of t steps in each randomly selected area, every passing
node also becoming the witnesses. Single stage memory or conditional random walk choses the
next node to be visited if the following condition is satisfied; “the node should not be the cur-
rent node or previously passed node”, i.e. the location claim is forwarded to the next selected
node only if at walk step t + 1, the node should neither be the node (previous one) at walk step
t– 1 nor the node (current one) at random walk step t.
The next node can be chosen by using another way which checks for the least visited node
or the node that has maximum energy resources and buffer capacity (memory) [38, 40]. The
least visited node is favorable in a case when the random walk reaches such a node whose all
neighbors are already visited before and still the random walk steps are left. In the latter case,
Fig 4. Working Principle of RAND [13, 14]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g004
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the network lifetime increases by evenly and uniformly utilizing the energy and buffer
resources of sensor nodes. Hence the next randomly selected node is selected by each node fol-
lowing the above procedure and each node continues doing this until the length of random
walk. On finding a conflict (two different location claims with same node ID), witness node
broadcasts the two conflicting claims and revokes the replicas. Having the conflicting claims as
evidence, the signatures are verified and links with replicas are terminated by every node. Fig 5
shows the pseudo code for next neighbor selection method in the proposed SSRWND
protocol.
Analysis of SSRWND
This section presents the theoretical discussion about the security and efficiency of SSRWND.
Analysis of Network Division and Area Selection Mechanism. Network configuration
step divides the entire network into areas, assigning a particular area to each node. Supposing
the network division into (At) number of areas (e.g. A1, A2, A3, A4. . .. . .n), and assuming the
minimum number of areas to be At = 3, the network division depends upon many factors
including the security of witnesses, size of the network and an area, and overall communication
cost. The division of the network into minimum number of 2 areas is not feasible since through
area selection mechanism both of the areas will be selected thus making it easy for an adversary
to discover and identify the critical witnesses, thus, compromising the whole area with little
effort for sheltering and evading detection. When the network is divided into At 3 areas, the
reporters have opportunities to select different combinations of areas in more than one ways,
hence predicting about reporters selection of areas (in turn about the witnesses) becomes
tough for adversaries. Therefore, witnesses will be more secured with network division into
minimum of At 3 areas.
Since the area size is a significant factor, it is mandatory to investigate about the network
division into possible smallest and largest sized areas, so as to gain higher security of witnesses.
The size of an area is also by influences the total number of nodes. We can calculate the
approximate size of each area (single selected area (Sa)) when the total number of nodes in
Fig 5. Pseudo-code for next neighbor selection in SSRWND.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g005
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network (Nn) are divided by the total number of areas in the network (At). It can be expressed
by the formula in Eq (4).
Sa 
Nn
At
 
where fNn  At and At  3g
ð4Þ
The network division into three areas is shown in Fig 3. In the beginning of the detection
process location claim is ﬁrst sent to the neighbors by a claimer node and with some probability
the location claim is then forwarded to randomly selected nodes by the neighbors that are
located at different areas. The proposed area selection mechanism is used by every reporter for
randomly selecting area(s) which deﬁnes that how many areas reporter should select from the
total number of areas, depending upon the number of areas the entire network is divided into.
With network division into odd number of areas (> = 3), the reporters will randomly select
areas Using Eq (1). Likewise with network division into even number of areas (> = 4), the
reporters will randomly select areas using Eq (2). Generally area selection can be performed
using Eq (5).
Areas to Select Nsað Þ ¼
At þ 1
2
 
ð5Þ
The possible combinations for any number of areas are unordered and without replacement.
A number of different areas (As) can be selected by every reporter out of the total areas (At) in a
number of ways as Nc ¼ AtAs
 
. Eq (3) can be used to calculate the total number of possible
combinations.
The clone detection schemes based on witness nodes are highly dependent upon the way
the witnesses are selected since the norms for witness selection insure the protection and secu-
rity of critical witnesses through proper witness distribution, in turn increasing the detection
probability of clones. Witness node based mechanisms aim to shield the witnesses so that a
skilled and clever adversary remain incapable to compromise them. Aiming to achieve this
much potential we propose that the network division into areas is combined with single stage
memory random walk with the provision of an effective area selection mechanism to select wit-
nesses. This concept provides uniform witness distribution in the whole network with the
added security to handle smarter attackers.
The Expected Return Time of RandomWalk. In this section different ways are explored
to find out the expected return time of random walk to its already passed node (previously
passed node). If there is only one random walk initiated in the network, the return time (Ri) for
random walk can be approximated as p
logðtÞ ; where t!1, where t!1) for inﬁnite grid [41].
In case of ﬁnite grid and smaller random walk steps (t) the expected return time of a random
walk can be calculated using following equation [42]:
PfRi ¼ tg ¼ L0;0ðtÞ=4t ð6Þ
Where L0,0(t) is the total number of valid paths that returns to 0 in t steps and 4t is the total
number of possible paths of t steps.
Security Analysis. SSRWND fulfills the optimal requirements of witness node based
schemes (presented in section III). To perform the security analysis, we analyze the resiliency
of SSRWND against smart attacker whose aim is to compromise the critical witness nodes (i.e.,
nodes that are responsible for the detection and revocation of clones). It is important to note
that for non-deterministic and randomized protocols, any smart adversary needs to wait for
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the execution of the protocol and the clones he/she deployed in the network must become the
part of the detection process by following the protocol execution.
For the additional security of witnesses, SSRWND leverages the network division into areas
and in randomly selected areas initiation of random walks. Any area can be selected with equal
probability by any reporter (i.e., 1/At). First a random node is selected in these randomly
selected areas and in each area that node will further select some random nodes for initiating
(r) random walks, the passing nodes become the witnesses. Consequently, a skillful attacker
will be impotent in finding out the critical witnesses before the protocol execution. In addition
to that, the security of witnesses is guaranteed through non-deterministic and random selection
of witnesses such that there will be an equal probability of each node to become a witness node
without involving a base station or cluster head. As a result, it is probably very challenging for
an expert adversary to guess about the witnesses.
Smarter adversaries that are aiming to locate and neutralize the crucial witnesses can be able
to learn about the randomly selected areas and then in each area further determining the ran-
domly selected starting node. In this way adversaries that are scanning and compromising all
the current witness node’s neighbors can reach to the next witness and then keep on
compromising the passing witnesses for t random walk steps for t times.
For a particular node, an adversary needs to compromise the total number of nodes as
O
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nn
At
q
log
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nn
At
q 
; which an adversary is inept to do so (assuming that only a limited number of
nodes can be compromised by an adversary).
Possibly an attacker is able to compromise an intermediate node of a random walk. In such
a case, an attacker even cannot guess about next witnesses since he/she needs to scan all the d
neighbors of the current node in order to find out the next witness node. However, an attacker
can try to back-track the previously passed nodes which cannot help the attacker since each
node deletes its history (previous node information) after forwarding the location claim to its
next node.
Efficiency Analysis. To evaluate the efficiency of SSRWND, we have used three metrics,
probability of detection, communication and memory cost. These metrics are chosen according
to the nature of WSNs as these sensors have limited resources in terms of memory and energy.
Memory and Communication costs are one of factors to be considered because they might
affect life time of the WSNs as they are resource constrained. On the other hand high detection
probability with moderate overheads is main objective of any detection scheme.
I. Probability of Detection: The most important performance metric for clone detection
schemes is the probability of successful detection as it is the primary security requirement
of any detection scheme to detect the attack occurrence with high probability. Detection
probability is defined as the total number of successful detections of clone nodes during
each detection round divided by total protocol runs. The probability of replica/ clone
detection is calculated by following formula.
Probability of Detection ¼ ðTotal # of Successful DetectionÞðTotal # of Simulation RunsÞ  100 ð7Þ
The detection probability of RAWL, TRAWL, RAND and SSRWND is closely related to the
number of random walk steps, since the increased number of walk steps result into higher
detection probability. The reason is that: more walk steps increase the chances of intersections
among the random walk steps (number of common nodes). As discussed earlier SSRWND
overcomes the natural problem of simple random walk of revisiting of already passed node
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which in result allows the random walk to visit unpassed nodes, consequently increasing the
chances of intersection.
II. Communication Cost: The most crucial performance metric for sensor network proto-
cols is the Communication cost since communication in WSNs uses more energy than
other operations [43]. Communication cost is defined as the average number of location
claim packets that are sent and received by each node during the detection round. The
clone detection probability is raised by increasing the number of random walks and walk
steps but correspondingly the communication costs are also increased. Comparing to
RAWL, TRAWL and RAND, SSRWND requires less number of random walks and walk
steps.
III. Memory Cost:Memory cost is another important performance metric. Since low cost
sensor nodes resource constrained and thus the techniques which require more storage
are considered to be impractical. Memory cost is defined as the average number of loca-
tion claims that are stored by each node in the areas. More walk steps mean more nods to
store the location claims, SSRWND require less walk steps as compare to RAND, RAWL
and TRAWL which in turn need less nodes to store the locations claims.
Simulation Results
SSRWND, RAND, RAWL, and TRAWL are evaluated by comparing their performance in
probability of clone detection, communication and memory costs incurred. For a reasonable
assessment and simplify the comparison, similar simulation methodology is applied as used in
[14]. In 160 x 160 square grid areas, 1024 nodes are deployed. The communication range of
each node is set to 5m and each node in the network normally has degree, d = 4. In Table 1, the
settings and parameters which were considered for simulations are shown.
For each random walk, the simulations are run for 10,000 times randomly and exclusively
by dividing the network into different number of areas (e.g. 3, 4 & 5). During simulations,
higher probability of detecting clones achieved by RAWL and TRAWL though initiating more
long random walks is noticed. In RAND and SSRWND, the network can be divided into any
number of small areas. In our experiments, the network is divided into three areas (minimum).
This is because, on the division of the network into two areas, the reporters have to randomly
select nodes form both the areas (according to Eq (2) of area selection), thus, the intended secu-
rity cannot be achieved. However, minimum number of three areas will form an additional
layer of security, making it difficult for an adversary to guess about which areas are selected for
forwarding the location claim. The total communication and memory costs will increase with
the division of the network into larger number of areas.
Detection Probability
This subsection analyzes the probability of clone detection for RAWL, TRAWL, RAND and
SSRWND by scrutinizing the intersecting witness nodes. Theoretically as well as through
Table 1. Settings and Parameters for Simulation.
Simulation Parameter Parameter Values
Sensor Nodes 1024
Average number of neighbors 4
Deployment/ topology type Square Grid (160m x 160m)
Communication range 5m
Location Claim size 46 bytes
Number of simulations runs 10000
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.t001
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simulations we observed that at-least one intersecting area is enough for higher probability of
detection and security of witness nodes and successful clone detection requires a single inter-
secting witness node.
It is shown in Figs 6 and 7 that the detection probability of SSRWND, RAND, RAWL and
TRAWL becomes higher with the increase in walk steps incurring higher communication and
memory overheads while setting the number of random walks as 3 and 4 respectively for
SSRWND, RAND, RAWL and TRAWL. The network is divided into 3 and 5 areas in case of
both RAND and SSRWND for the calculation of required walk steps. So, it is verified through
simulations that to achieve similar detection probability, random walk steps needed for
SSRWND are less in comparison to RAND, RAWL and TRAWL.
Communication & Memory Overhead
In WSNs, communication requires more energy than other operations [43]. More number of
random walks and walk steps increase the communication and memory costs. RAWL and
TRAWL incur twice the communication cost of LSM so as to achieve 95% detection probability
Fig 6. Detection Probability vs. walks step (r = 3 & # areas = 3 & 5)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g006
Fig 7. Detection Probability vs. walks step (r = 4 & # areas = 3 & 5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g007
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and thus trading higher communication overhead for stronger security. RAND, SSRWND,
RAWL and TRAWL involve two kinds of communication costs that are incurred for detection
method. Cost incurred when the location claim is forwarded to the randomly selected nodes
from the reporters. And the other cost incurred is when random walks are initiated till the end
of all random walk steps by randomly selected nodes. So, the total communication cost
incurred is the sum of these two costs.
Communication costs of RAWL and TRAWL are of two types, first, when the location
claim is forwarded between reporters and randomly selected nodes. And second when random
walks are initiated by randomly selected nodes. In case of SSRWND and RAND, the communi-
cation costs involved are the costs incurred when a single random node is selected by the
reporters in each area. The further cost incurred is when r random walks are initiated by each
randomly selected node that is selected by the reporter in each area. When two randomly
selected nodes are deployed randomly (on a unit square) the average distance between them is
approximately equal to
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nn
p
2
 
[9].
Figs 8, 9, 10 and 11 show the communication overheads of SSRWND, RAND, RAWL, and
TRAWL while setting the value of r (random walk) as 3 and 4. In case of SSRWND and RAND
Fig 8. Detection Probability vs. Avg. Bytes Sent (r = 3 & # areas = 3)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g008
Fig 9. Detection Probability vs Avg Bytes Sent (r = 3 & # areas = 5)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g009
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the number of areas is set to be 3 and 5. The results show that in order to achieve 95% detection
probability SSRWND incurs lower communication costs than RAND, RAWL and TRAWL.
Similarly Figs 12, 13. 14 and 15 show the memory overheads for SSRWND, RAND, RAWL
and TRAWL. Fig 12 demonstrates that for achieving 95% detection probability, SSRWND
requires 61% and 38% less memory than RAWL & RAND respectively when r = 3 and
areas = 3.
Fig 13 demonstrates that SSRWND requires 72% and 39% less memory than RAWL and
RAND respectively when r = 3 and areas = 5. In Fig 14 when r = 4 and areas = 3, SSRWND
requires 62% and 35% less memory than RAWL & RAND respectively, and in Fig 15 when
r = 4 and areas = 5, SSRWND requires 71% and 33% less memory then RAWL & RAND
respectively. TRAWL consumes less memory than RAWL, RAND and SSRWND because it
uses trace table at each node for recording the traces of random walks. The results show a mini-
mal difference between memory overheads of SSRWND and TRAWL.
Fig 10. Detection Probability vs. Avg. Bytes Sent (r = 4 & # areas = 3)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g010
Fig 11. Detection Probability vs, Avg, Bytes Sent (r = 4 & # areas = 5)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g011
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Discussion
The communication and memory cost calculations for SSRWND, RAND, RAWL and TRAWL
are shown in Table 2 in order to achieve 95% detection probability while setting r = 3, 4, 5
and 6 for each of 3, 4 and 5 areas in the case of SSRWND and RAND. The location claim is
assumed to be 46 bytes (2 bytes for ID, 4 bytes for location and 40 bytes for signature, e.g.
ECDSA [44]) for calculating the memory overhead of SSRWND, RAND, RAWL and TRAWL.
The results convey that communication and memory overheads introduced by SSRWND are
much lower than RAND, RAWL and TRAWL. SSRWND is also more resistant to smart and
powerful adversaries than RAWL and TRAWL. In RAWL and TRAWL an adversary can be so
strong that he/she can discover the whole paths of random walks by monitoring and analyzing
network traffic globally. But, in case of SSRWND parallel random walks are initiated in differ-
ent areas of the network which create a high level of difficulty for an adversary to find out the
critical witness nodes as compared to RAWL and TRAWL.
Fig 12. Detection Probability vs. Avg. Bytes Stored (r = 3 & # areas = 3)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g012
Fig 13. Detection Probability vs. Avg. Bytes Stored (r = 3 & # areas = 5)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g013
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Conclusion
The clone detection protocols like RAND and RAWL employ SRW which revisits the
already passed nodes naturally, which reduces witness node intersection and detection prob-
ability. Focusing on the problem of node revisiting, this paper presents a distributed tech-
nique called Single Stage Memory RandomWalk with Network Division (SSRWND) that
improves the RAND protocol by merging constrained memory random walk with network
division. SSRWND achieves much better results than RAND, RAWL and TRAWL because
it employs random walk with memory in which the last visited node is kept in a record so as
to decrease the node revisits. SSRWND attains greater witness node security with higher
probability of detecting clones and moderate overheads (communication & memory). Some
of the applications of SSRWND include security oriented application fields of WSNs like
military and medical etc. In future we aim to perform the scalability analysis of our proposed
protocol.
Fig 14. Detection Probability vs. Avg. Bytes Stored (r = 4 & # areas = 3)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g014
Fig 15. Detection Probability vs. Avg. Bytes Stored (r = 4 & # areas = 5)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.g015
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Table 2. Costs incurred for Communication andMemory in achieving 95%Detection Probability.
Scheme r t Na/Nsa CC-1 CC-2 Total Communication Total Memory Cost
RAND 3 48 3/2 2 x 16 = 32 3 x 48 = 144 352 b/w 2.16kb & 12.94kb
4 25 3/2 2 x 16 = 32 4 x 25 = 100 264 b/w 2.16kb & 8.98kb
5 16 3/2 2 x 16 = 32 5 x 16 = 80 224 b/w 1.8kb & 7.19kb
6 11 3/2 2 x 16 = 32 6 x 11 = 66 196 b/w 1.62kb & 5.93kb
3 18 4/3 3 x 16 = 48 3 x 18 = 54 306 b/w 2.02kb & 7.28kb
4 10 4/3 3 x 16 = 48 4 x 10 = 40 264 b/w 1.62kb & 5.39kb
5 7 4/3 3 x 16 = 48 5 x 7 = 35 249 b/w 2.02kb & 4.72kb
6 5 4/3 3 x 16 = 48 6 x 5 = 30 234 b/w 1.62kb & 4.04kb
3 23 5/3 3 x 16 = 48 3 x 23 = 69 351 b/w 2.02kb & 9.3kb
4 12 5/3 3 x 16 = 48 4 x 12 = 48 288 b/w 1.62kb & 6.47kb
5 8 5/3 3 x 16 = 48 5 x 8 = 40 264 b/w 1.34kb & 5.39kb
6 6 5/3 3 x 16 = 48 6 x 6 = 36 252 b/w 1.62kb & 4.85kb
SSRWND 3 29 3/2 2 x 16 = 32 3 x 29 = 87 238 b/w 1.62kb & 7.82kb
4 16 3/2 2 x 16 = 32 4 x 16 = 64 192 b/w 1.44kb & 5.75kb
5 11 3/2 2 x 16 = 32 5 x 11 = 55 174 b/w 1.8kb & 4.94kb
6 8 3/2 2 x 16 = 32 6 x 8 = 48 160 b/w 1.62kb & 4.31kb
3 12 4/3 3 x 16 = 48 3 x 12 = 36 252 b/w 1.62kb & 4.85kb
4 8 4/3 3 x 16 = 48 4 x 8 = 32 240 b/w 1.62kb & 4.31kb
5 6 4/3 3 x 16 = 48 5 x 6 = 30 234 b/w 2.02kb & 4.04kb
6 4 4/3 3 x 16 = 48 4 x 6 = 24 216 b/w 1.62kb & 3.23kb
3 14 5/3 3 x 16 = 48 3 x 14 = 42 270 b/w 1.62kb & 5.66kb
4 8 5/3 3 x 16 = 48 4 x 8 = 32 240 b/w 1.62kb & 4.31kb
5 6 5/3 3 x 16 = 48 5 x 6 = 30 234 b/w 1.35kb & 4.04kb
6 5 5/3 3 x 16 = 48 6 x 5 = 30 234 b/w 1.62kb & 4.04kb
RAWL 3 150 - 3 x 16 = 48 3 x 150 = 450 498 b/w 2.56kb & 20.2kb
4 85 - 4 x 16 = 64 4 x 85 = 340 404 b/w 2.16kb & 15.27kb
5 51 - 5 x 16 = 80 5 x 51 = 204 335 b/w 2.92kb & 11.46kb
6 36 - 6 x 16 = 96 6 x 36 = 216 312 b/w 2.16kb & 9.7kb
TRAWL 3 150 - 3 x 16 = 48 3 x 150 = 450 498 b/w 0.68 kb & 5.36kb
4 85 - 4 x 16 = 64 4 x 85 = 340 404 b/w 0.57 kb & 4.05kb
5 51 - 5 x 16 = 80 5 x 51 = 204 335 b/w 0.77 kb & 3.04kb
6 36 - 6 x 16 = 96 6 x 36 = 216 312 b/w 0.57 kb & 2.57kb
r = Random walks, t= walk steps, Na = # of total areas in the network, Nsa = # of selected areas
CC-1 = Between reporter and random node (Communication cost), CC-2 = Communication cost for selecting nodes by random walks
Total Communication Cost = CC-1 + CC-2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158072.t002
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